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CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES 
 
A.  Parties  
 Freedom Watch, Inc. is a 501(c)(3) non-profit and a Plaintiff/Appellant. 
Laura Loomer is an individual and a Plaintiff/Appellant. Google, Inc. is a 
corporation and a Defendant/Appellee. Facebook, Inc. is a corporation and a 
Defendant/Appellee. Twitter, Inc. is a corporation and a Defendant/Appellee. 
Apple, Inc. is a corporation and a Defendant/Appellee There were no amici in the 
district court. 
B.  Rulings 
 Appellants appeal from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia’s 
order granting the Defendants/Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss and all other rulings 
averse to Appellants in this matter. App. ___.  
C.  Related Cases 
 This case was not previously before this court or any other court.  
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
 
 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”) 26.1, Appellants 
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FED R. APP. P. 35 STATEMENT 
 
 Numerous errors pervade the 4-page panel opinion, but in particular, its 
treatment of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”) brings this 
case within the Fed. R. App. P. 35 standard. This is an issue of exceptional 
importance, as people in modern society have increasingly, and almost entirely at 
this point, replaced the traditional physical “public forum” with the internet and 
social media. This rings particularly true given the current state of events, with 
COVID-19 severely hampering the ability of individuals to physically gather. With 
the extreme uncertainty around the future of large physical gatherings, it is more 
incumbent on this Court than ever accept reality and  to adapt and evolve with the 
changing times and make the “common sense” ruling that the internet and social 
media qualifies as a “place of public accommodation” under the DCHRA.  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 Appellants brought this suit against Appellees, all of whom are major 
technology and social media corporations, in response to their well-documented 
and publicized pattern and practice of restraining trade by suppressing and 
censoring conservative content. The Amended Complaint sets forth in extreme 
detail news publications which include admissions from employees employed by 
Defendants that such targeted suppression and censorship was, indeed, occurring. 
For example, this includes admissions, inter alia, from employees of Defendant 
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Facebook that their conduct had a chilling effect on conservative news.” App. 
0117. 
 As set forth below, Appellees’ conduct violates not only the antitrust laws 
and the  Constitution, but also numerous federal and state statutes. Appellees’ 
status as large and influential technology corporations simply cannot shield them 
from liability in this regard. They must be held to the same level playing field as 
everyone else, and since Appellants have pled viable causes of action which are 
supported by well pled concrete facts, the District Court dismissed Appellants’ 
claims in error. 
 This Amended Complaint is centered upon Appellees’ “conspiracy to 
intentionally and willfully suppress politically conservative content,” App. 0112, 
and the resulting severe damages that this conspiracy has had on Freedom Watch 
and Ms. Loomer, both of whom are prominent conservative organizations/figures 
who rely on social media platforms to “to inform the public about [their] 
conservative advocacy and to raise the funds through donations to further its public 
advocacy and mission.” App. 0119. The aim of this conspiracy to suppress 
politically conservative content is to “take down President Donald Trump and his 
administration with the intent and purpose to have installed leftist government in 
the nation’s capital and the 50 states.” App. 0125. 
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 The Amended Complaint sets forth in detail how Appellees have acted to 
suppress and censor conservative content. For instance, YouTube, which is owned 
and operated by its parent company, Appellee Google, demonetized the channels 
of the conservative Prager University and Western Journal and also targeted 
conservative pundit Alex Jones of InfoWars due to their conservative political 
viewpoints. App. 0112-0119. Furthermore, the Amended Complaint details how 
Google has censored conservative content via its search engine, with “an incredible 
96% of Google search results for ‘Trump’ news came from liberal media outlets, 
using the widely accepted Sharyl Attkisson media bias chart.” App. 0115. 
 The Amended Complaint also sets forth in detail how Facebook has 
censored and suppressed conservative content, including through the admissions of 
it former employees who admitted that they “routinely suppressed news stories of 
interest to conservative readers from [its] influential ‘trending’ news section” App. 
0116. In 2018, Facebook instituted an algorithm change that further suppressed 
conservative content. App 0117. According to a study by Western Journal, 
“Liberal publishers have gained about 2 percent more web traffic from Facebook 
than they were getting prior to the algorithm changes implemented in early 
February. On the other hand, conservative [and thus Republican] publishers have 
lost an average of nearly 14 percent of their traffic from Facebook.” App 0117-
0118. This is not accidental. By Facebook’s own admission, Campbell Brown, the 
USCA Case #19-7030      Document #1850361            Filed: 07/06/2020      Page 7 of 17
4 
 
leader of Facebook’s news partnerships team, admitted that Facebook would be 
censoring news publishers based on its own internal biases, stating: 
This is not us stepping back from news. This is us changing our 
relationship with publishers and emphasizing something that 
Facebook has never done before: It’s having a point of view, and it’s 
leaning into quality news. … We are, for the first time in the history 
of Facebook, taking a step to try to to define what ‘quality news’ 
looks like and give that a boost.” App 0118. 
 
 The Complaint also sets forth how Twitter “has banned nasty accounts 
perceived as right-wing while ignoring similar activity from the left.” App. 0119. 
This includes “shadow-banning” conservative accounts while ignoring radical left-
wing interest groups. App. 0119. 
 The Amended Complaint details how, “[s]ince Defendants have begun 
suppressing and censoring Freedom Watch’s content on these platforms, Freedom 
Watch has suffered a dramatic loss in viewership and user engagement, and this 
has led directly and proximately to a dramatic loss in revenue.” App. 0121. For 
instance, Freedom Watch’s YouTube channel “has remained static and is now 
declining especially over the last several months, after years of steady grow[th], 
which simply cannot be a coincidence given the facts set forth in the previous 
section.” App 0120. Freedom Watch has experienced a declining number of 
subscribers after experiencing years of steady growth right when Defendants began 
suppressing conservative content. App. 0120. Crucially, the Amended Complaint 
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alleges that these damages are “the result of the illegal and anti-competition actions 
as pled herein.” App. 0121. 
 Appellant Loomer is a well known conservative investigative journalist and 
activist, and a Jewish woman. App. 0121-0122. Ms. Loomer relied heavily on 
social media platforms in order to perform her work as a journalist, with over 
260,000 followers on Twitter as of November 21, 2018. App. 0122. In furtherance 
of their conspiracy to suppress conservative content, Defendant Twitter 
permanently banned Ms. Loomer on November 21, 2018 for the following tweet: 
Ilhan is pro Sharia Ilhan is pro- FGM Under Sharia homosexuals are 
oppressed & killed. Women are abused & forced to wear the hijab. 
Ilhan is anti Jewish. App. 0122. 
 
Facebook also banned Ms. Loomer for 30 days.  App. 0122. Today, years later she 
has been totally banned. 
ARGUMENT 
 
I. APPELLANTS’ DCHRA CLAIM 
 
 The Panel’s treatment of Appellants’ claims under the DCHRA, specifically 
finding that a “place of public accommodation” needs to be a physical location was 
in error. It is undeniable that this issue is one of extreme importance, given the 
rapidly changing ways that humans interact with one another, and the fact this has 
been exponentially compounded due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, even 
recently, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals courthouse was closed for an 
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extended period of time, forcing everyone who wished to utilize its services to do 
so via the internet. This is undeniably the wave of the future, as people are less and 
less likely to physically gather, or even physically go out into the world for 
essential services. Groceries are now delivered. Meals are delivered. Instead of 
having to go to a traditional retailer, any person can buy just about any item they 
need on Amazon. The traditional “place of public accommodation” is a dying 
breed and when it is usable it has been overrun by violent vigilantes. This Court 
needs to update its archaic definition of it to keep pace with the modern world. 
 This undeniable truth has been recognized by seemingly everyone but the 
Appellees (who have a vested interest in the status quo) and the original panel on 
this appeal. This issue has prompted compelling and well-researched amicus briefs 
from both Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and the Washington 
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, as well as the District of 
Columbia itself showing exactly why the District Court’s finding was in error, 
which should be reviewed thoroughly, en banc – such is the importance of this 
petition. 
 In addition to the arguments set forth by the amici curiae, the U.S District 
Court for the Southern District of New York in Del-Orden v. Bonobos, Inc., 2017 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209251 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2017) found that “[a] commercial 
website itself qualifies as a place of ‘public accommodation’ to which Title III of 
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the ADA affords a right of equal access.” Del-Orden v. Bonobos, Inc., 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 209251, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2017). See also National 
Federation of the Blind v. Scribd Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 565 (D. Vt. 2015) (holding 
that that Title III applied to a digital library subscription service, Scribd, accessible 
only via the Internet).  
 The First Circuit’s ruling in Carparts Distribution Ctr. v. Auto. Wholesaler's 
Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994) is particularly instructive. The Carparts court 
found that “public accommodations” under the ADA were not limited to actual 
physical structures. In doing so, Carparts paid particular attention to the fact that 
Congress included “travel service” on its list of services considered “public 
accommodations,” holding that “Congress clearly contemplated that "service 
establishments" include providers of services which do not require a person to 
physically enter an actual physical structure.” Id. at 19. Tellingly, in its definition 
of “Place of public accommodation,” the D.C. Code also lists “travel or tour 
advisory services” as a place of public accommodation where discrimination is not 
allowed. Indeed, this Court has itself expressly adopted the reasoning set forth in 
Carparts, holding: 
Title III's protections extend beyond physical access to insurance 
offices and prohibit discrimination based on disability in the 
enjoyment of the goods and services made available at a place 
of public accommodation. See Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. 
Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 
1994) (finding that public accommodation "is not limited to 
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actual physical structures" and may include access to insurance plans). 
Baron v. Dulinski, 928 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 
 The panel recognized that the ADA and the DCHRA are “similar,” but chose 
not to make the leap to adapt with changing practices and trends like other courts 
have already done. This is why en banc review is so crucial, as it presents an 
opportunity for this Court to review and follow the example set by these other 
courts. 
II. APPELLANTS’ ANTITRUST CLAIMS 
 
 The Panel further erred with regard to Appellants’ claims under the Sherman 
Act when the found that “Freedom Watch does not explain why either factor tends 
to show an unlawful conspiracy, rather than lawful independent action by the 
different Platforms.” The Amended Complaint alleged that Appellees acted against 
their own economic self-interest in their concerted action to restrain trade: 
Defendants’ agreement has a plainly anti-competitive effect and has 
no rational economic justification, as they are willing to lose revenue 
from conservative organizations and individuals like Freedom Watch 
and those similarly situated to further their leftist agenda and designs 
to effectively overthrow President Trump and his administration and 
have installed leftist government in this district and the 50 states.  
 
There is no legitimate independent business reason for Defendants 
“conscious parallelism,” as they are losing revenue from conservative 
organizations and individuals like Freedom Watch and those similarly 
situated.  
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Thus, the Amended Complaint alleged that all of the Appellees were engaged in 
the same behavior that directly caused a loss in revenue. There is simply no 
explanation for this other than concerted action. 
III. APPELLANTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS 
 
 The Panel’s further erred in finding that Appellees were not subject to First 
Amendment restrictions, but it failed to address the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
 In Packingham, the Supreme Court held that a North Carolina law making it 
a felony for a registered sex offender to access social networking sites where the 
offender knows that the site allows for minors to join was unconstitutional and in 
violation of the First Amendment.  
 In Packingham, Mr. Packingham pled guilty to “taking indecent liberties 
with a child.” As a result, he was required to register as a sex offender, which 
therefore barred him from accessing commercial social media sites. Id. at 1734. 
Under a pseudonym, Mr. Packingham signed up for Facebook and made a post 
celebrating the fact that the state court had dismissed a traffic ticket against him. 
Id. After doing some research, the police department determined that it was Mr. 
Packingham who had made the post, and was subsequently indicted for violating 
N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§14-202.5. Id. The lower court denied Mr. Packingham’s 
motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds, the appellate court reversed, and 
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the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed again. Finally, the Supreme Court 
reversed a final time, finding a constitutional First Amendment violation. 
 “A fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have 
access to places where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak 
and listen once more. The Court has sought to protect the right to speak in 
this spatial context.” Id. at 1735. “While in the past there may have been difficulty 
in identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of 
views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace—the “vast democratic forums 
of the Internet” in general, and social media in particular.” Id. (emphasis 
added) (internal citation omitted). “In short, social media users employ these 
websites to engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment activity on topics 
‘as diverse as human thought.’” Id. at 1735-36 (citing Reno v. American Civil 
Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844 (1997)). Accordingly, the Supreme Court found 
that access to these social media sites could form the basis for a constitutional First 
Amendment issue, and after applying intermediate scrutiny, found that the statute 
was unconstitutional. Id. at 1736. 
 Although Packingham did involve a challenge to a state law, it also does 
stand for the proposition that denial to access to social media platforms can form 
the basis for constitutional violations. This is indicative of the fact that is clear that 
the Internet has overtaken physical public spaces in the traditional sense as the 
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chosen forum for public debate and discourse, which is what the First Amendment 
specifically seeks to protect. The law surrounding social media and the internet is 
constantly changing to adapt to what new possibilities technological advances can 
bring. Not too long ago, people had to be at home, on their computers and using a 
DSL connection just to access their Facebook accounts. Only short time before 
that, people had to scour for free AOL and NetZero discs to dial up to 56K 
connections in order to check their Myspace pages.  
 In a shockingly short period of time, social media has evolved to the primary 
driver of culture and speech that every individual, including the honorable judges 
on this Court, carry on their mobile phones everywhere they go. This just goes to 
demonstrate the fact that the law needs to evolve to keep up with technology. Gone 
are the days where people show must up to a public space to protest an injustice. 
Now, anyone can simply take out their phones and engage in constitutionally 
protected debate and discourse with anyone in the world, all through Appellees’ 
platforms. Thus, a finding that they are quasi-state actors, capable of being sued for 
constitutional violations is also an essential progression in the law to ensure that 
Appellees are not allowed to unilaterally control the tide of the nation, and the 
world’s debate and discourse in their own favor.  More importantly, this is the only 
reasonable interpretation of the law as written given present day practices and 
realities. 




 Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there are issues of exceptional 
importance at stake that this Court, en banc, must  step in and address. It is 
incumbent on this Court to recognize and adapt to changing times to ensure that 
the law keeps up with the reality. This is an opportunity now for the Court do so. 
       Appellants respectfully request oral argument, by Zoom or Skype if necessary. 
The three judge panel denied this request, but oral argument, with all parties 
present, is now the best way, to flush out the important issues at stake. 
       This case is not just about Freedom Watch and Ms. Loomer, but all Americans 
who desire to exercise their rights of free speech, free from the illegal and anti-
competitive practices of giant social media companies, who have restrained trade 
and who believe and act as if they are above the law. 
 
Dated: July 6, 2020    Respectfully Submitted, 
 
       /s/ Larry Klayman_______ 
 Larry Klayman, Esq.  
                                                               Klayman Law Group, P.A. 
 2020 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.  
 Suite 800 
 Washington, D.C. 20006 
 Tel: (561) 558-5336 
 Email: leklayman@gmail.com 
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 Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants  
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